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Abstract
We present a generic strategy improvement algorithm (GSIA) to find an optimal strategy of simple
stochastic games (SSG). We prove the correctness of GSIA, and derive a general complexity bound,
which implies and improves on the results of several articles. First, we remove the assumption that
the SSG is stopping, which is usually obtained by a polynomial blowup of the game. Second, we
prove a tight bound on the denominator of the values associated to a strategy, and use it to prove
that all strategy improvement algorithms are in fact fixed parameter tractable in the number r of
random vertices. All known strategy improvement algorithms can be seen as instances of GSIA,
which allows to analyze the complexity of converge from below by Condon [14] and to propose a class
of algorithms generalising Gimbert and Horn’s algorithm [16, 17]. These algorithms terminate in at
most r! iterations, and for binary SSGs, they do less iterations than the current best deterministic
algorithm given by Ibsen-Jensen and Miltersen [18].
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1 Introduction
A simple stochastic game, or SSG, is a two-player turn-based zero-sum game with perfect
information introduced by Condon [13]. It is a simpler version of stochastic games, previously
defined by Shapley [23]. An SSG is played by two players max and min moving a pebble on
a graph. Vertices are divided into min vertices, max vertices, random vertices and a target
vertex for max. When the pebble reaches a min or max vertex, corresponding players move
the pebble to a neighbouring vertex of their choice. If it reaches a random vertex, the next
vertex is chosen at random following some probability law. Finally, when the pebble reaches
the target vertex, min pays 1 to max . The goal of min is to minimise the probability to
reach the target vertex while max must maximise this probability.
We study the algorithmic problem of solving an SSG, i.e. finding a pair of optimal
strategies in an SSG, or equivalently the optimal value vector of the optimal probabilities
for max to reach the sink from each vertex. There are always optimal strategies for both
players that are positional [13], i.e. stationary and deterministic, but the number of positional
strategies is exponential in the size of the game. Consequently, finding a pair of optimal
strategies is a problem not known to be in FP, but it is in PPAD [20], a class included
in FNP.
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Simple Stochastic Games can be used to simulate many classical games such as parity
games, mean or discounted payoff games [2, 9]. Moreover, stochastic versions of these games
are equivalent to SSGs [2], which underlines that SSGs are an important model to study.
SSGs have applications in different domains such as model checking of modal µ-calculus [24],
or modelling autonomous urban driving [11].
There are roughly three known methods to solve SSGs: strategy improvement, value
iteration and quadratic programming. A strategy improvement algorithm (SIA) starts with a
strategy for one player and improves it until it is optimal, whereas value iteration algorithms
(VIA) update a value vector by elementary operations, which converges to the optimal value
vector of the game. Implementations of those algorithms have been written and compared
in [21].
Denote by n be the number of max vertices and r be the number of random vertices in an
SSG. For SSGs with max vertices of outdegree 2, the best known deterministic algorithm is
an SIA which makes at worst O (2n/n) iterations (see [25]), and the best known randomised
algorithm is a SIA described by Ludwig in [22], which runs in 2O(
√
n).
Gimbert and Horn give an SIA in [16], running in O∗ (r!) iterations, namely a superpoly-
nomial dependency in r only (O∗ omits polynomial factors in r and n). For SSGs where
random vertices have a probability distribution (1/2, 1/2) (coin toss), Ibsen-Jensen and
Miltersen present a VIA of complexity in O∗ (2r) [18]. It turns out that all SIA runs in
O∗ (2r) on SSGs with probability distribution (1/2, 1/2), as we prove in this article. The
same complexity of O∗ (2r) is obtained for general SSGs with a more involved randomised
algorithm in [5].
Most of the aforementioned algorithms rely on the game being stopping, meaning that it
structurally ends in a sink with probability 1. This condition is not restrictive since any SSG
can be transformed into a stopping SSG while keeping the same optimal strategies. However,
this transformation incurs a quadratic blow-up of the game and cannot be used in real life
application. In this paper we give bounds in O (2rPoly(n)) computational time for some kinds






complexity. The stopping restriction has been lifted for quadratic programming in [21] and
before that for SIA and VIA in [10, 8].
Contributions
We introduce GSIA, a new meta-algorithm to solve SSGs in Sec. 3. This algorithm proves
simultaneously the correctness of multiple algorithms ([14, 16, 15, 25, 18, 5]). In Sec. 4, we
give a general complexity bound that matches or improves on previous bounds obtained by
ad-hoc methods. We show that all these algorithms are fixed-parameter tractable in the
number of random vertices. Moreover, we do not rely on the fact that the game is stopping,
which was commonly used in the aforementioned papers. The proof of correctness relies on a
notion of concatenation for strategies and an analysis of absorbing sets in the game, while the
complexity bound is derived from a new and tight characterisation of the values of an SSG.
Finally, in Sec. 5, we show how GSIA can be used to derive new algorithms, generalising
classical ones. In particular, we exhibit a class of algorithms which generalise Gimbert and
Horn’s algorithm and use less iterations than Ibsen-Jensen and Miltersen’s algorithm.
We emphasise that our goal here is not to define a new algorithm that would have a
better –but still exponential– complexity bound than the state of the art (a sub-exponential
algorithm for SSGs, like the ones found for parity games [6, 12], would already be a significant
improvement), but rather to wrap-up a lot of previous research by showing that all known
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SIA for SSGs, despite having emerged in different contexts and having ad-hoc proofs of
convergence, are in fact instances of a general pattern that can be further expanded, and
actually share the best known complexity bounds.
2 Simple Properties of Simple Stochastic Games
Some proofs are missing from this extended abstract for space reason, but they can be found
in the appendices or in a long version [3].
2.1 Simple Stochastic Games
We give a generalised definition of Simple Stochastic Game, a two-player zero-sum game with
turn-based moves and perfect information introduced by Anne Condon [14].
▶ Definition 1. A Simple Stochastic Game (SSG) is a directed graph G, together with:
1. A partition of the vertex set V in four parts Vmax, Vmin, VR and VS (all possibly empty,
except VS), satisfying the following conditions:
a. every vertex of Vmax, Vmin or VR has at least one outgoing arc;
b. every vertex of VS has exactly one outgoing arc which is a loop on itself.
2. For every x ∈ VR, a probability distribution px(·) with rational values, on the outneigh-
bourhood of x.
3. For every x ∈ VS, a value Val(x) which is a rational number in the closed interval [0, 1].
In the article, we denote |Vmax| by n and |VR| by r. Vertices from Vmax, Vmin, VR and VS
are respectively called max vertices, min vertices, random vertices and sinks. For x ∈ V , we
denote by N+(x) the set of outneighbours of x. We assume that for every x ∈ VR and y ∈ V ,
y ∈ N+(x) if and only if px(y) > 0.
The game is played as follows. The two players are named max and min. A token is
positioned on a starting vertex x. If x is in Vmax (resp. Vmin) the max player (resp. the min
player) chooses one of the outneighbours of x to move the token to. If x is in VR, the token
is randomly moved to one of the outneighbours of x according to the probability distribution
px(·), independently of everything else. This process continues until the token reaches a sink
s and then, player min has to pay Val(s) to player max and the game stops. The problem
we study is to find the best possible strategies for min and max, and the expected value that
min has to pay to max while following those strategies.
We consider a slightly restricted class of SSGs where the probability distribution on each
random vertex has a given precision and the value of the sinks are 0 and 1.
▶ Definition 2. For q a positive integer, we say that an SSG is a q-SSG if there are only two
sinks of value 0 and 1, and for all x ∈ VR, there is an integer qx ≤ q such that the probability
distribution px(·) can be written as px(x′) =
ℓx,x′
qx
for all x′ where ℓx,x′ is a natural number.
As an example, let x be a random vertex of a 2-SSG, and let u ∈ N+(x), then px(u) can
be equal to 0, 1/2 or 1. The case px(u) = 0 is forbidden by definition, and if px(u) = 1,
then x is of degree one and can be removed (by redirecting arcs entering x directly to u),
without changing anything about the outcome of the game. Hence, we suppose without
loss of generality that each random vertex of a 2-SSG has degree 2 and has probability
distribution (1/2, 1/2). This definition matches the one of a binary SSG, given by Condon
and used in most articles on SSGs, except that we allow here max and min vertices to have
an outdegree larger than 2.
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2.2 Play, History and Strategies
▶ Definition 3. A play in G is an infinite sequence of vertices X = (x0, x1, x2, · · · ) such
that for all t ≥ 0, (xt, xt+1) is an arc of G.
If for a play X = (xt) there is some t ≥ 0 with xt = s ∈ VS , then all subsequent vertices
in the play are also equal to s. In this case, we say that the play reaches sink vertex s and
we define the value of the play Val(X) as Val(s). If the play reaches no sink, then we set
Val(X) = 0.
A history of G is a finite directed path h = (x0, x1, · · · , xk). If the last vertex xk is a
max vertex (resp. min vertex), we say that h is a max history (resp. min history).
▶ Definition 4. A general max strategy (resp. general min strategy) is a map σ assigning
to every max history (resp. min history) h = (x0, x1, · · · , xk) a vertex σ(h) which is an
outneighbour of xk. The set of these strategies is denoted by Σmaxgen (resp. Σmingen).
For σ ∈ Σmaxgen and τ ∈ Σmingen, given a starting vertex x0, we recursively define a random
play X = (X0, X1, · · · ) of G in the following way. At t = 0 let X0 = x0, and for t ≥ 0:
if Xt ∈ Vmax, define Xt+1 = σ(X0, X1, · · · , Xt);
if Xt ∈ Vmin, define Xt+1 = τ(X0, X1, · · · , Xt);
if Xt ∈ VR, then Xt+1 is an outneighbour of Xt chosen following the probability distribu-
tion pXt(·), independently of everything else;
if Xt ∈ VS , define Xt+1 = Xt.
This defines a distribution on plays which we denote by Px0σ,τ (·), or simply P (·) if strategies
and starting vertex are clear from context. The corresponding expected value and conditional
expected values are denoted by Ex0σ,τ (·|·), or simply E (·|·).
We now define positional strategies which only depend on the last vertex in the history:
▶ Definition 5. A general max strategy σ (resp. min strategy) is said to be positional if for
any max vertex x (resp. min vertex) and any history h = (x0, . . . , x), we have σ(h) = σ((x))
where (x) is the history containing only x as a start vertex. The set of positional max
strategies (resp. min strategies) is denoted Σmax (resp. Σmin).
2.3 Values in an SSG
▶ Definition 6. Let G be an SSG and let (σ, τ) be a pair of max and min strategies, the
value vector vGσ,τ is the real vector of dimension |V | defined by, for any x0 ∈ V ,
vGσ,τ (x0) = Ex0σ,τ (Val(X)) .
This value represents the expected gains for player max if both players plays according to
(σ, τ) and the game starts in vertex x0.
As before, the superscript G can be omitted when the context is clear.
To compare value vectors, we use the pointwise order: we say that v ≥ v′ if for all vertices
x ∈ V we have v(x) ≥ v′(x). Moreover, we say that v > v′ if v ≥ v′ and there is some x such
that v(x) > v′(x). Given a max strategy σ, a best response to σ is a min strategy τ such
that vσ,τ ≤ vσ,τ ′ for all min strategies τ ′.
▶ Proposition 7 ([14]). A positional strategy admits a positional best response, which can be
found in polynomial time using linear programming.
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The set of positional best responses to σ is denoted by BR(σ). Similarly, for a min
strategy τ , we define the notion of best response to τ and the corresponding set is denoted
by BR(τ). Except explicitly stated otherwise (in Sec. 3.3), all considered strategies are
positional.
We denote by τ(σ) a positional best response to σ. For a max strategy σ and τ ∈ BR(σ),
we write vσ for vσ,τ . For a min strategy τ and σ ∈ BR(τ), we write vτ for vσ,τ . The vector
vσ is called the value vector of strategy σ, and is used to compare strategies by writing
σ′ >
G
σ if and only if vGσ′ > vGσ .
It is well known (see [14, 25]) that there is a pair of deterministic positional strategies
(σ∗, τ∗) called optimal strategies, that satisfies for all x, v∗ = vσ∗,τ∗ = vσ∗ = vτ∗ since σ∗
and τ∗ are best responses to each other.
2.4 Optimality Conditions
The next two lemmas give characterisations of (optimal) value vectors under a pair of
strategies. They are fundamental to all algorithms finding optimal strategies. Proofs of
similar results can be found in [13]; we add here a fifth condition to make the characterisation
hold when the game is not stopping.
For any SSG, the vertices with value 0 under optimal strategies can be found in linear
time by a simple graph traversal computing its complementary, the set of max vertices which
can access a sink of positive value, regardless of the choice of the min player. Let KG be the
set of vertices with value0 under optimal strategies. For a max strategy σ of G and a min
strategy τ , we call KGσ,τ the set of vertices with value zero under the pair of strategies σ, τ ,
and KGσ the set of vertices with value zero under σ, τ when τ is a best response to σ.
▶ Lemma 8. Given positional strategies (σ, τ) and a real |V |-dimensional vector v, one has
equality between v and vσ,τ if and only if the following conditions are met:
(i) For s ∈ VS, v(s) = Val(s)




(iii) For x ∈ Vmin, v(x) = v(τ(x))
(iv) For x ∈ Vmax, v(x) = v(σ(x))
(v) For any x ∈ V , v(x) = 0, if and only if x ∈ KGσ,τ
Moreover, τ ∈ BR(σ) if and only if for any x in Vmin, v(x) = min
y∈N+(x)
v(y) = v(τ(x)) and
the last condition is modified into v(x) = 0 if and only if x ∈ KGσ .
▶ Lemma 9 (Optimality conditions). Given positional strategies (σ, τ) and denoting v = vσ,τ ,
(σ, τ) are optimal strategies if and only if:
(i) For s ∈ VS, v(s) = Val(s)




(iii) For x ∈ Vmin, v(x) = min
y∈N+(x)
v(y)
(iv) For x ∈ Vmax, v(x) = max
y∈N+(x)
v(y)
(v) For any x ∈ V , v(x) = 0, if and only if x ∈ KG
The conditions of Lemma 9 imply that (σ, τ) is a certificate of optimality that can be
checked in polynomial time: compute vσ,τ by solving the linear system of Lemma 8, compute
KG in linear time, then check in linear time if conditions are met.
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Figure 1 Transformation of the graph G in G[{(x2, x3)}, f ] where f((x2, x3)) = 0.3.
3 Generic Strategy Improvement Algorithm
3.1 Game Transformation
We present a simple transformation of an SSG, where some arcs of the game are rerouted to
new sinks with appropriate values.
▶ Definition 10. Let G be an SSG, A be a subset of the arcs of G and f be a function from
A to the set of rational numbers. Let G[A, f ] be the SSG obtained from a copy of G with
the following modifications: each arc e = (x, y) ∈ A is removed and replaced in G[A, f ] by
e′ = (x, se) where se is a new sink vertex with value f(e). These new sinks of G[A, f ] are
called A-sinks, and A is called the set of fixed arcs.
Note that in the previous definition, the end vertex y of an arc (x, y) ∈ A is not removed
from the game. Its incoming arcs which are in A are simply redirected to sinks, see Fig. 1.
The function f is usually given by the values of a a strategy: we denote by G[A, σ] the
game G[A, f ], where f is defined on every arc e = (x, y) of A by f(e) = vσ(y). Comparing
G and G[A, σ], the only differences are that arcs of A have their endpoints changed to new
sinks. Therefore, a strategy defined in G can be interpreted as a strategy of G[A, σ] and vice
versa, and we identify strategies in G and G[A, σ]. However, when we compare the values of
a strategy in both games (as in Lemma 12 below), it makes sense to compare only the values
on vertices in G and not on A-sinks (and anyway values of A-sinks are fixed).
▶ Lemma 11. For an SSG G, a subset of arcs A, and a max strategy σ, KGσ = KG[A,σ]σ .
Proof. Fix a min strategy τ and define RGσ,τ (x) as the set of vertices that can be reached
from x in G, following only arcs corresponding to σ and τ after max and min vertices, and
any arc out of random vertices. We repeatedly use the easy fact that the three following
assertions are equivalent:
(i) vGσ,τ (x) = 0;
(ii) vGσ,τ (y) = 0 for all y ∈ RGσ,τ (x);
(iii) ValG(s) = 0 for all s ∈ V GS ∩RGσ,τ (x).
The same equivalence is true in G[A, σ], where we define RG[A,σ]σ,τ likewise. Denote by RGA(x)
vertices of RGσ,τ (x) that are endpoints of arcs in A, and let SA(x) be the corresponding
A-sinks in G[A, σ].
Suppose that vGσ,τ (x) = 0 and consider a sink s in V
G[A,σ]
S ∩R
G[A,σ](x): either it belongs
to V GS hence also to RG(x) and satisfies ValG(s) = 0 by (iii), or it belongs to SA(x) and
then by definition
ValG[A,σ](s) = vGσ (s) ≤ vGσ,τ (s) = 0.
Thus, by (iii) once again we have vG[A,σ]σ,τ (x) = 0.
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Conversely, suppose that vG[A,σ]σ,τ (x) = 0 and let s ∈ V GS ∩ RGσ,τ (x). Then, either s ∈
RG[A,σ]σ,τ , hence by (iii)
ValG(s) = ValG[A,σ](s) = 0,
or there is a y ∈ RGA(x) such that s ∈ RGσ,τ (y). In this case we have vGσ,τ (y) = 0 by (ii), hence
ValG(s) = 0 by (iii) applied to y, and we see that vGσ,τ (x) = 0.
Since we have vGσ,τ (x) = 0 if and only if vG[A,σ]σ,τ (x) = 0, regardless of τ , the result
follows. ◀
▶ Lemma 12. For an SSG G, a subset of arcs A, and a max strategy σ, vGσ = vG[A,σ]σ .
Proof. This is a direct consequence of Lemma 8 and Lemma 11, since the vector vGσ satisfies
the best-response conditions in G[A, σ] and vice versa. ◀
3.2 The Algorithm
An SSG is stopping if under every pair of strategies, a play eventually reaches a sink
with probability 1. Most algorithms in the literature depend on the game being stopping.
It is usually not seen as a limitation since it is possible to transform every SSG into a
stopping SSG, but the transformation makes the game polynomially larger by adding O(nr)
random vertices, which is bad from a complexity point of view, especially for algorithm with
parametrized complexity in the number of random vertices. We strengthen the classical
order on strategies, to get rid of the stopping condition in the generic strategy improvement
algorithm presented in this section.
▶ Definition 13. Let σ and σ′ be two max strategies, then σ′ ≻
G
σ if σ′ >
G
σ and for every
max vertex x, if vGσ′(x) = vGσ (x), then σ′(x) = σ(x).
Algorithm 1 is a classical strategy improvement algorithm with two twists: the improve-
ment is for the stricter order ≻ and it is guaranteed in the transformed game rather than
in the original game. We call Algorithm 1 the Generic Strategy Improvement Algorithm,
or GSIA.
Algorithm 1 GSIA.
Data: G a stopping SSG
Result: (σ, τ) a pair of optimal strategies
1 begin
2 select an initial max strategy σ
3 while (σ, τ(σ)) are not optimal strategies of G do
4 choose a subset A of arcs of G
5 find σ′ such that σ′ ≻
G[A,σ]
σ.
6 σ ←− σ′
7 return (σ, τ(σ))
Algorithm 1 is a generic algorithm (or meta-algorithm) because neither the selection of
an initial strategy σ at line 2, nor the way of choosing A at line 4, nor the way of finding σ′
at line 5, are specified. A choice of implementation for these three parts is an instance of
GSIA, that is a concrete strategy improvement algorithm.
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Note that if σ′ >
G[A,σ]
σ is found, it is easy to find σ′′ with σ′′ ≻
G[A,σ]
σ: define σ′′ as equal
to σ′, except for max vertices x such that vGσ′(x) = vGσ (x) and σ′(x) ̸= σ(x) where σ′′(x) is
defined as σ(x).
When we prove some property of GSIA in this article, it means that the property is true
for all instances of GSIA, that is regardless of the selection of the initial strategy, the set A
and the method for selecting σ′.
In order to prove the correctness of GSIA, we need to prove two points:
1. If σ is not optimal in G, then σ is not optimal in G[A, σ].
2. If σ′ ≻
G[A,σ]
σ then σ′ >
G
σ.
The first point is proved in the following lemma, while the second one is harder to obtain
and is the subject of the next two subsections.
▶ Lemma 14. For an SSG G and a subset of arcs A, a max strategy σ is optimal in G if
and only if it is optimal in G[A, σ].
Proof. Except on A-sinks, the value vectors of σ in G and G[A, σ] are equal by Lemma 12.
Furthermore, by Lemma 11, KGσ = KG[A,σ]σ ; hence σ satisfies the optimality conditions of
Lemma 9 in G if and only if it satisfies them in G[A, σ]. ◀
3.3 Concatenation of Strategies
As a tool for proving the correctness of Algorithm 1, we introduce the notion of concatenation
of strategies which produces non-positional strategies even if both concatenated strategies
are positional. The idea of using a sequence of concatenated strategies to interpolate between
two strategies has been introduced in [17].
▶ Definition 15. For two max strategies σ, σ′ and a subset of arcs A, we call σ′|Aσ the
non-positional strategy that plays like σ′ until an arc of A is crossed, and then plays like σ
until the end of the game. We let σ′|0Aσ = σ and for all i ≥ 0, σ′|i+1A σ = σ
′|A(σ′|iAσ).
When A is clear from the context, we omit it and write σ′|iσ. Strategy σ′|iAσ is the
strategy that plays like σ′ until i arcs from A have been crossed, and then plays like σ. Hence,
we can relate the strategy σ′|Aσ to a positional strategy in G[A, σ] as shown in the next
lemma.
▶ Lemma 16. For two max strategies σ, σ′ and a subset of arcs A, we have: vGσ′|Aσ = v
G[A,σ]
σ′
Proof. In G, after crossing an arc from A, by definition of σ′|Aσ, max plays according to
σ. The game being memoryless, from this point, the best response for min is to play like
τ(σ) ∈ BR(σ). Thus, there is a best response to σ′|σ of the form τ ′|τ(σ) with τ ′ a min
strategy not necessarily positional. Let us consider a play following (σ′|σ, τ |τ(σ)) with τ any
min strategy. If the play does not cross an arc of A, then there is no difference between this
play and a play following (σ′, τ) in G[A, σ]. If an arc of A is used, then by Lemma 12 there
is no difference between stopping with the value of G[A, σ] or continuing in G while following
(σ, τ). Thus we have: vGσ′|σ,τ |τ(σ) = v
G[A,σ]
σ′,τ .
Thus, if τ ′ is a best response to σ′ in G[A, σ], then τ ′|τ(σ) is a best response to σ′|σ in
G. This implies that vGσ′|σ = v
G[A,σ]
σ′ . ◀
We now prove the fact that increasing the values of sinks can only increase the value of
the game (a similar lemma is proved in [4]).
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▶ Lemma 17. Let G and G′ be two identical SSGs except the values of theirs sinks s ∈ VS,
denoted respectively by Val(s) and Val ′(s). If for every s ∈ VS, Val ′(s) ≥ Val(s), then for
every max strategy σ we have vG
′
σ ≥ vGσ .
Proof. For s ∈ VS , let Pxσ,τ (→ s) be the probability that the play ends in sink s while











Pxσ,τ (→ s)Val(s) = vGσ,τ (x)
This is true for any min strategy τ , thus vG
′
σ ≥ vGσ . ◀
The following proposition is the core idea of GSIA: a strategy which improves on σ in
the transformed game also improves on σ in the original game. The proof relies on a precise
analysis of the set of vertices which cannot reach a sink, to deal with the fact that the game
is not stopping. We prove that, if σ′ ≻
G[A,σ]
σ the limit of vGσ′|iσ is v
G
σ′ and the two previous
lemmas imply σ′|iσ ≥ σ′|i−1σ > σ, which yields the following proposition.
▶ Proposition 18. Let G be an SSG, A a subset of arcs of G and σ, σ′ two max strategies.
If σ′ ≻
G[A,σ]
σ then σ′ >
G
σ.
In order to avoid requiring the game to be stopping, it is necessary to pay particular
attention to the set of vertices where the play can loop infinitely and yield value zero, which
is a subset of the set of vertices of value 0. We now prove that a step of GSIA can only
reduce this set, which is then used to prove Proposition 18.
▶ Definition 19. For an SSG G and two strategies (σ, τ), an absorbing set Z is a subset of
V ∖ VS such that starting from any vertex of Z and playing according to (σ, τ), there is a
probability zero of reaching a vertex of V ∖ Z.
For σ and τ two strategies, Z(σ, τ) is the set of all vertices in some absorbing set under
(σ, τ). Hence, Z(σ, τ) is also an absorbing set. By definition, a play remains stuck in an
absorbing set and can never reach a sink, hence all vertices of an absorbing set have value
zero under (σ, τ). The next lemma proves the existence of the inclusion-wise maximum over
τ of Z(σ, τ) that we denote by Z(σ). An example is given Fig. 2.
▶ Lemma 20. For every max strategy σ, there is τ ∈ BR(σ) such that for every min strategy
τ ′, we have Z(σ, τ ′) ⊆ Z(σ, τ).
Proof. For τ in BR(σ) and τ ′ such that Z(σ, τ ′) ⊈ Z(σ, τ), then we define τ̃ as τ̃(x) = τ ′(x)
for x in Z(σ, τ ′) and τ̃(x) = τ(x) otherwise. We now prove that τ̃ ∈ BR(σ) and Z(σ, τ̃) ⊇
Z(σ, τ) ∪ Z(σ, τ ′).
Since τ is a best response to σ, we have vσ,τ (x) ≤ vσ,τ ′(x). Moreover, for x ∈ Z(σ, τ ′),
vσ,τ ′(x) = 0 thus vσ,τ (x) = 0. From this, we deduce that the two systems of linear equations
given by Lemma 8, characterising respectively vectors vσ,τ and vσ,τ̃ , are exactly the same:
for the only vertices where τ̃(x) and τ(x) differ satisfy vσ,τ (τ(x)) = vσ,τ (τ̃(x)) = 0. Hence,
we have vσ,τ = vσ,τ̃ and τ̃ ∈ BR(σ).
For any play under strategies (σ, τ̃) starting in x ∈ Z(σ, τ ′), the min vertices of the play
are all in Z(σ, τ ′) because τ̃ plays as τ ′ on these vertices. Thus, we have Z(σ, τ ′) ⊆ Z(σ, τ̃).
For a play starting in x ∈ Z(σ, τ), either the play reaches a vertex of Z(σ, τ ′) and then stays
in Z(σ, τ ′) or it plays like τ and stays in Z(σ, τ). Hence, we have Z(σ, τ) ⊆ Z(σ, τ̃). ◀
MFCS 2021












Figure 2 Example of an SSG where the x, n and r vertices are respectively from Vmax, Vmin and
VR. The pair of strategy (σ, τ) is displayed as plain arrows. Here Z(σ, τ) = Z(σ) = {n1, x1, x2}.
From this we deduce the following result on the improvement step for GSIA (where
absorbing sets are understood in G):
▶ Proposition 21 (Proof in Appendix A). Let G be an SSG, A a set of arcs of G, σ and σ′
two max strategies such that σ′ ≻
G[A,σ]
σ, then Z(σ′) ⊆ Z(σ).
We now prove Proposition 18.
Proof. We introduce a sequence of non-positional strategies (σi)i≥0 defined by σi = σ′|iσ
for i ≥ 1. By hypothesis σ′ ≻
G[A,σ]
σ, and by Lemma 16 vGσ′|Aσ = v
G[A,σ]







σ = vGσ .
Hence, by definition, sinks of G[A, σ1] will have at least the values of the corresponding
sinks in G[A, σ]. Applying Lemma 17, we obtain that vG[A,σ1]σ′ ≥ v
G[A,σ]
σ′ , which can also be
written as vGσ2 ≥ v
G
σ1 . More generally, we have:







We now prove that vGσ′ ≥ vGσ1 to conclude the proof.
From now on, we only consider the game G. Fix a vertex x and a min strategy τ ∈ BR(σ′)
such that Z(σ′) = Z(σ′, τ). From Proposition 21 we know that, Z(σ′) ⊆ Z(σ). It implies
that for every z ∈ Z(σ′), vGσ (z) = vGσ′(z) = 0 which implies that v
G[A,σ]
σ′ (z) = 0. Thus,
σ′(z) = σ(z). It implies that Z(σ′) ⊆ Z(σ, τ).
We now only consider G′ the game G where we replace every vertex in Z(σ′, τ) by a sink
of value 0. Lemma 12 directly implies that vGσ = vG
′
σ′ and vGσ′ = vG
′
σ′ . Moreover, when playing
following σi when a vertex of Z(σ′) is reached, for all possible history, the play will stay in
the absorbing set. Thus, vGσi = v
G′
σi .
Recall that Pxσ′,τ (→ s) is the probability to reach a sink s in G′ while starting in x and
following (σ′, τ). Let T σ
′,τ be a random variable defined as the time at which a sink is
reached. Note that T σ
′,τ may be equal to +∞.
D. Auger, X. Badin de Montjoye, and Y. Strozecki 12:11
For every i ≥ 1, we use Bayes rule to express the value of vσ′,τ (x) while conditioning on
finishing the game before i steps.




Pxσ′,τ (→ s | T σ
′,τ < i)Val(s)




Pxσ′,τ (→ s | +∞ > T σ
′,τ ≥ i)Val(s)
If T σi,τ < i, only i arcs have been crossed, thus at most i arcs from A have been crossed
when the sink is reached. Hence σi acts like σ′ during the whole play, which yields:
vσ′,τ (x) =P(T σi,τ < i)
∑
s∈VS
Pxσi,τ (→ s | T
σi,τ < i)Val(s)




Pxσ′,τ (→ s | +∞ > T σ
′,τ ≥ i)Val(s)
We use Bayes rule in the same way for vσi,τ (x)
vσi,τ (x) =P(T σi,τ < i)
∑
s∈VS
Pxσi,τ (→ s | T
σi,τ < i)Val(s)
+ P(i ≤ T σi,τ < +∞)
∑
s∈VS
Pxσi,τ (→ s | T
σi,τ ≥ i)Val(s)
Since every absorbing vertex in G associated with σ′ has been turned into a sink, in G′
P(T σ
′,τ < i) = P(T σi,τ < i) converges to 1 when i grows. Hence, both P(i ≤ T σ
′,τ < +∞)
and P(i ≤ T σi,τ < +∞) go to 0 and
lim
i→+∞
|vσ′,τ (x)− vσi,τ (x)| = 0.
Hence, if there was x such that vσ′(x) < vσ1(x), we denote ϵ = vσ1(x) − vσ′(x). For
some rank I for all i ≥ I we have |vσ′,τ − vσi,τ | < ϵ/2. Which implies vσi,τ (x) < vσ1(x). We
recall that vσ1(x) ≤ vσi(x). This means that vσi,τ < vσi(x), which contradicts the notion of





As a consequence of all previous lemmas, we obtain the correction of GSIA.
▶ Theorem 22. GSIA terminates and returns a pair of optimal strategies.
Proof. We denote by σi the max strategy σ at the end of the i-th loop in Algorithm 1. By
induction, we prove that the sequence σi is of increasing value. Indeed, Line 5 of Algorithm 1
guarantees that σ′ ≻
G[A,σ]
σ, thus Prop. 18 implies that σ′ >
G
σ, that is σi+1 > σi.
The strategies produced by the algorithm are positional, hence there is only a finite
number of them. Since the sequence is strictly increasing, it stops at some point. The
algorithm only stops when Line 5 of Algorithm 1 fails to find σ′ ≻
G[A,σ]
σ. In other words, σ
is optimal in G[A, σ]. By Lemma 14, σ is also optimal in G. ◀
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4 Complexity of GSIA
We analyse the algorithmic complexity of GSIA, by lower bounding the values of the sequence
of strategies it produces. We obtain a bound on the number of iterations of GSIA depending
on the number of random vertices, rather than on the number of max or min vertices. Then,
we can derive the complexity of any instance of GSIA, by evaluating the cost of computing
σ′ from σ in G[A, σ].
4.1 Values of q-SSGs
To prove a complexity bound using the values of a strategy, we need to precisely characterise
the form of these values. In a 2-SSG, there is a function f(r) such that, for every pair of
positional strategies (σ, τ), there is t ≤ f(r), such that for every vertex x, there is an integer
px, such that vσ,τ (x) =
px
t
Condon proved in [13] that f(r) ≤ 4r. Then Auger, Coucheney and Strozecki improved
this to f(r) ≤ 6r/2 in [4]. We show that f(r) = qr for q-SSGs, which gives the improved
bound of f(r) ≤ 2r for 2-SSGs.
▶ Theorem 23 (Proof in Appendix B). Let q ≥ 1 and G a q-SSG with r random vertices,
then for any pair of strategies (σ, τ) there is t ≤ qr such that, for every vertex x, there is an




Proof of Th. 23 relies on the matrix tree theorem applied to a directed multigraph
representing the game under a pair of strategies. Let us show that qr is a tight bound for
f(r). Consider a Markov chain (an SSG with no max nor min vertices) with r + 2 vertices:
two sinks 0 and 1 and r random vertices x1, . . . , xr. Vertex x1 goes to 1 with probability 1/q
and to 0 with probability (q − 1)/q. For r ≥ i ≥ 2, xi goes to 0 with probability (q − 1)/q
and to xr−1 with probability 1/q. Then, the value of xr is q−r.
4.2 Bounding the Number of Iterations of GSIA
GSIA produces a sequence of strictly increasing positional max strategies. The number
of positional max strategies is bounded by |Σmax| =
∏
x∈Vmax
deg(x), hence the number of
iterations of GSIA is bounded by this value. If we consider the case of a binary SSG (all
vertices of outdegree 2), we have the classical bound of |Σmax| = 2n iterations. The best
known bound for a deterministic algorithm is 2n/n iterations obtained for Hoffman-Karp
algorithm [25], which is not far from the trivial bound of 2n iterations.
We give a bound for q-SSG, which depends on q and r the number of random vertices.
The difference of two values written as a/b and c/d, with a and b less than q−r is more than
q−2r. Hence, if a value increases in GSIA, it increases at least by q−2r. Using the classical
notion of switch and anti-switch [25], recalled in Appendix C, we can prove that all vertices
which have their value increased by a step of GSIA, are increased by at least q−r.
▶ Theorem 24 (Proof in Appendix C). For G a q-SSG with r random vertices and n max
vertices, the number of iterations of GSIA is at most nqr.
The complexity of GSIA is the number of iterations given by Th. 24, multiplied by the
complexity of an iteration. In an iteration, there are two sources of complexity: constructing
the game G[A, σ] and finding an improving strategy σ′ in G[A, σ]. To construct the game, vσ
is computed by solving a linear program of size m up to precision p = qr. Let C1(m, p) be the
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complexity of computing vσ, then the best bound is currently in O(mω log(p)) [19], with ω the
current best bound on the matrix multiplication exponent. Let C2(n, r, q) be the complexity
of computing σ′, the complexity of an iteration is in O(nqr(C1(n + r, qr) + C2(n, r, q)).
We obtain a better complexity, when C2(n, r, q) = O(C1(n, qr)r/n), which is the case for
most instances of GSIA mentionned in this article. The number of iterations is only rqr if
we can guarantee that a random vertex increases its value at each step. When no random
vertex is improved, the cost of computing G[A, σ] can be made smaller, which yields the
following theorem.
▶ Theorem 25 (Proof in Appendix D). Let G be a q-SSG with r random vertices and n max
vertices. If C2(n, r, q) = O(C1(n, qr)r/n), then the complexity of GSIA is in O(rqrC1(n, qr)).
5 Two Instances of GSIA
As previously mentioned, all known strategy improvement algorithms can be viewed as
particular instances of GSIA. This includes e.g. switch-based algorithms, like Hoffman-Karp
algorithm [14, 25] or Ludwig’s recursive algorithm [22]. With the help of GSIA it also
becomes very easy to derive new algorithms, by transforming the game into polynomial
time solvable instances, such as almost acyclic games [4]. We detail all these old and new
algorithms in Sec. 6.
In this section, we focus instead on two particular instances (or family of instances) of
GSIA, for which we obtain new complexity bounds using the results of the previous sections.
5.1 GSIA and f -strategies
The strategy improvement algorithm proposed by Gimbert and Horn in [16] (denoted by
GHA) can be viewed as an instance of GSIA where the set A of fixed arcs is the set R of all
arcs going out of random vertices, and the improvement step in the subgame G[R, σ] consists
in taking an optimal strategy. In this case, the subgame G[R, σ] is deterministic (random
vertices are connected to sinks only and can be replaced by sinks), hence optimal values in
G[R, σ] depend only on the relative ordering of the values vσ(x) for sink and random vertices
x of G. These values can be computed in O(r log(r) + n) time [1]. In the original paper [16],
the algorithm is proposed in a context where the number of sinks is two, but we generalise
their definitions to our context.
Consider a total ordering f on VR ∪ VS , f : x1 < x2 < · · · < xr+s, where s is the
number of sinks. An f -strategy corresponding to this ordering is an optimal max strategy in
the game where the s + r vertices above are replaced by sinks with new values satisfying
Val(x1) < Val(x2) < · · · < Val(xr+s). Clearly, this strategy does not depend on the actual
values given but only on f . Note that if several f -strategies exist for a given f , they share
the same values on all vertices.
Algorithm GHA produces an improving sequence of f -strategies, and the two sinks of
value zero and one are always first and last in the order, hence its number of iterations is
bounded by r!, the total number of possible orderings of the random vertices. We extend
this result to a large class of instances of GSIA: let us call Optimal-GSIA (Opt-GSIA), the
meta algorithm obtained from Algorithm 1 with two additional constraints:
the set A of fixed arcs is the same at each step of Algorithm 1;
at line 5, the improving strategy σ′ is the optimal strategy in G[A, σ].
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All classical algorithms captured by GSIA, or new ones presented in this article are in
fact instances of Opt-GSIA. We now show that Opt-GSIA has an iteration number similar to
GHA. Since we have proved a bound of nqr iterations, by Th. 24, Opt-GSIA has essentially
the best known number of iterations, for q small and large (the latter being interesting in
the case of random vertices with large degree and arbitrary probability distributions).
▶ Theorem 26. Consider an SSG G and a set of arcs A containing k arcs out of max or
min vertices. Then Algorithm Opt-GSIA runs in at most min((r + k)qr, (r + k)!) iterations.
Proof. Let σ be one of the iterated max strategies obtained by an instance of Opt-GSIA,
and σ′ be an optimal strategy in G[A, σ]. Then σ′ is consequently an f -strategy in G[A, σ],
where f is the ordering on VR ∪ VA (where VA is the set of A-sinks) which is induced by
the value vector vG[A,σ]σ′ (if vertices have the same value, just arbitrarily decide their relative
ordering in f).
Since strategies produced by the algorithm strictly increase in values by Prop. 18, they
must be all distinct. Hence, the order f must be distinct at each step of the algorithm, which
proves that Opt-GSIA does at most (r + k)! iterations.
Moreover, at every step the value in G of at least one vertex in VR ∪VA must improve, by
at least q−r because of Th. 23. Since the value of these vertices is bounded by 1, the number
of iterations of Opt-GSIA is bounded by (r + k)qr. ◀
Those results can be used to generalize Gimbert and Horn’s Algorithm [16] and to compare
it with Ibsen-Jensen and Miltersen’s algorithm [18]. It is possible to create an instance of
GSIA with less iterations than Ibsen-Jensen and Miltersen’s algorithm and which terminates
exponentially faster on some input. Due to a lack of space this is detailed in a long version
of this paper [3].
5.2 Condon’s Converge From Below Algorithm
In [14], Condon first presents a faulty algorithm (the Naive Converge From Below Algorithm)
and then a correct modified version, the Converge From Below (CFB) Algorithm. This
algorithm proceeds by improving a value vector iteratively, but we show here that is in fact
a disguised strategy improvement algorithm, that can be seen as an instance of Opt-GSIA.
This gives us a proof of convergence of the CFB algorithm in the general, non-stopping
case (whereas Condon has the assumption that the game is stopping in her proof), and also
bounds on the number of iterations (none are given in the original paper) by Theorem 24
and Theorem 26.
The CFB algorithm is restated with some clarifications on listing 2 (we omit the details
of the linear program, see [14]). The algorithm uses two properties of a vector, that we now
define. First, vector v is feasible if
(i) For s ∈ VS , v(s) = Val(s)




(iii) For x ∈ Vmin, v(x) ≤ min
y∈N+(x)
v(y)
(iv) For x ∈ Vmax, v(x) ≥ max
y∈N+(x)
v(y).
A feasible vector is stable at x a min vertex (resp. max vertex) if satisfies condition (iii)
(resp. condition (iv)) of feasibility for x with an equality.
We now show by induction that the CFB algorithm is equivalent to the instance of
Opt-GSIA where all min vertices are fixed, i.e. A is the set of arcs entering min vertices. Let
Amin denote this set.
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To see this, suppose that at the beginning of line 5 of CFB, Vector vr is the value vector
of a max-strategy σ in G. Then:
at Line 5, we “update v as the feasible vector where all min vertices x have value vr(x) and
all max vertices are stable”. This amounts to finding a max-strategy σ′ which satisfies
optimality conditions in G[Amin, σ], i.e. an optimal strategy for max in this subgame.
This is exactly the subgame improvement step of Opt-GSIA. At the end of this step, v is
the optimal value vector in G[Amin, σ] ;
in the next loop, at Line 4 of CFB, we “compute the value vector vr of an optimal
response to the max strategy that plays greedily according to v”, i.e. vr is updated to the
value vector vGσ′ . This is precisely Line 6 of GSIA when we update values in the subgame.
Hence, we see that except for the initialisation where vr may not correspond to a max-
strategy, it will be the case as soon as we reach Line 5 of the first loop, and from this point
on CFB will correspond exactly to the instance of Opt-GSIA described above.
Algorithm 2 Converge From Below Algorithm.
Data: G an SSG
Result: The optimal value vector v∗ of G
1 begin
2 · let v be a feasible vector in which all min vertices have value 0 and all max
vertices are stable
3 while v is not an optimal value vector do
4 · use linear programming to compute the value vector vr of an optimal
response to the max strategy that plays greedily according to v
5 · update v as the feasible vector where all min vertices x have value vr(x) and
all max vertices are stable
6 return v
6 Algorithms Derived from GSIA
We show that all known strategy improvement algorithms can be expressed as instances of
GSIA and we also propose several new algorithms, derived from choices of A which make the
transformed game polynomial time solvable. The only algorithms which are not instances of
GSIA are based on values rather than strategies: value propagation [10, 14, 18], quadratic
programming [14, 21] and dichotomy [4].
6.1 Hoffman-Karp Algorithms
The most classical method to solve an SSG, called the Hoffman-Karp algorithm, repeatedly
applies switches to the strategy until finding the optimal one. It is also a generic algorithm,
since the choice of the set of vertices to switch at each step is not specified nor the choice of
the initial strategy. Many details on these algorithms can be found in [14] or [25].
Hoffman-Karp algorithms are instances of GSIA, where A is the set of all arcs of the
SSG. Indeed, as proved in Lemma 30, a switch σ′ of σ satisfies σ ≻
G[A,σ]
σ′. Interpreting
Hoffman-Karp algorithms as instances of GSIA proves that they work on non-stopping games,
while in most article the stopping condition is required. Moreover, it shows that their number
of iterations is O(nqr) on q-SSGs, a complexity exponential in r only, which was known only
for algorithms specially designed for this purpose [17, 15, 18, 5].
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Ludwig’s Algorithm [22], which is the best randomised algorithm to solve SSGs, can be
seen as an Hoffman-Karp algorithm using Bland’s rule as shown in [5]: a random order on
the vertices is drawn, and at each step, the first switchable vertex in the order is switched.
Two other Hoffman-Karp algorithms are presented in [25]: switching all switchable vertices at
each step or switching a random subset. Seeing these three algorithms as instances of GSIA
yields O(nqr) as a deterministic bound on their number of iterations, which was unknown.
However, the analysis of [22, 25] is required to obtain a good complexity in n for these
algorithms.
6.2 Selection of the Initial Strategy
In [15], Dai and Ge give a randomised improvement of GHA simply by choosing a better
initial strategy. To do so, they choose randomly
√
r! log(r!) strategies and choose the one
with the highest value. This ensures, with high probability, that at most
√
r! iterations




iterations. This algorithm is
also captured by GSIA by selecting the initial strategy in the same way, however it seems
hard to combine the gain made by the random selection of the strategy and the bound in
O(qr) of GSIA, since even a strategy close to the optimal one may have values far from it.
Remark that it is trivial to extend this method to any instance of Opt-GSIA to improve on
the complexity of Th. 26.
6.3 New Algorithms
We can use GSIA to design many strategy improvement algorithms. We present three of
them, all based on a choice of A which makes G[A, σ] solvable in polynomial time. The
initial strategy can be anything and σ′ is always chosen to be the optimal strategy in G[A, σ].
Most of them can be seen as generalisations of known algorithms.
1. Let A be a feedback arc set of G, then G[A, σ] is acyclic and it can be solved in linear
time. It seems intuitively appealing to think that this algorithm will be faster if the
feedback arc set is small but we have no proof to sustain such a proposition.
2. A max acyclic SSG is an SSG such that that every max vertex has at most one outgoing
arc in a cycle. max acyclic SSG can be solved in polynomial time, see [4]. If we let A be
a set of arc that contains all but one outgoing arcs of each max vertex, then G[A, σ] is
max acyclic and can be solved in polynomial time. Moreover, such a game can be solved
by strategy improvement in at most n iterations. This can be seen as a generalisation of
Hoffman-Karp algorithm, in which A contains all outgoing arcs of max vertices.
3. As an intermediate between acyclic games and max acyclic games, we may consider
almost acyclic games, where all vertices have at most one outgoing arc in a cycle. Almost
acyclic SSGs can be solved in linear time [4].
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21 Jan Křetínskỳ, Emanuel Ramneantu, Alexander Slivinskiy, and Maximilian Weininger. Com-
parison of algorithms for simple stochastic games. arXiv preprint, 2020. arXiv:2009.10882.
22 Walter Ludwig. A subexponential randomized algorithm for the simple stochastic game
problem. Information and computation, 117(1):151–155, 1995.
23 L. S. Shapley. Stochastic games. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 39(10):1095–
1100, 1953.
24 C Stirling. Bisimulation, modal logic and model checking games. Logic Journal of the IGPL,
7(1):103–124, 1999.
25 Rahul Tripathi, Elena Valkanova, and VS Anil Kumar. On strategy improvement algorithms
for simple stochastic games. Journal of Discrete Algorithms, 9(3):263–278, 2011.
MFCS 2021
12:18 A Generic Strategy Improvement Method for Simple Stochastic Games
A Proof of the decreasing absorbing set
Here we prove Prop. 21
Proof. Suppose that Z(σ′) is not a subset of Z(σ). From Lemma 20 there is τ ∈ BR(σ)
such that Z(σ, τ) = Z(σ) and τ ′ ∈ BR(σ′) such that Z(σ′, τ ′) = Z(σ′). We write Z = Z(σ′)
Let X be the set of max vertices x in Z(σ′)∖Z(σ) such that σ(x) ̸= σ′(x); it is nonempty





σ′ (x) > v
G[A,σ]
σ (x) ≥ 0
Thus, a sink is reached in G[A, σ] starting from x under the strategies (σ′, τ ′). Since Z is
an absorbing set in G under the same strategies, it implies that all the accessible sinks in
G[A, σ] are A-sinks. Hence, there is at least one arc e = (y, z) ∈ A with both ends in Z and
such that vσ(z) > 0. We define the vertex s of Z as:
s = arg max
z∈Z
{vσ(z) | ∃y ∈ V, (y, z) ∈ A}
and we let v = vσ(s). The value of each vertex in Z is bounded by v. Similarly than for x,
in G under strategies (σ, τ) the value of s is bounded by the value of the vertex leaving Z.
Such vertices exist since Z is not a subset of Z(σ). We now want to show that those vertices
all have value strictly lesser than v, thus proving a contradiction.
First, since Z is an absorbing set for (σ′, τ ′), all arcs leaving a random vertex in Z(σ′)
remain in Z(σ′) in G; this is not dependent on the strategies considered.
Let EX ⊆ X the set of max vertices x of X such that σ(x) /∈ Z and let EN ⊆ Z ∩ Vmin
the set of min vertices x of Z such that τ(x) /∈ Z.
On the one hand, for a min vertex x ∈ EN :
vGσ (τ(x)) ≤ vGσ (τ ′(x)) Since τ = τ(σ)
vGσ (τ ′(x)) = vG[A,σ]σ (τ ′(x))
vG[A,σ]σ (τ ′(x)) ≤ v
G[A,σ]
σ′ (τ






′(x)) ≤ v Since τ ′(x) ∈ Z
Thus, vGσ (τ(x)) ≤ v. In case of equality, we have v = vGσ (τ ′(x)) = vGσ (τ(x)); hence we can
replace τ by τ̄(x),which is identical to τ except that τ̄(x) = τ ′(x). We have vσ,τ = vσ,τ̄ and
Z(σ, τ) = Z(σ, τ̄). Indeed, according to Lemma 8 the only situation that could occur would
be to violate the condition (v) by creating an absorbing set. However this would contradict
the definition of τ . Thus, we can suppose that for any x in EN , vσ(τ(x)) < v.
On the other hand, since σ′ ≻
G[A,σ]
σ we know that for any x in EX :
vGσ (σ(x)) < v
G[A,σ]
σ′ (x) ≤ v
Now, for any vertex x of E = EX ∪ EN , let px be the probability of x being the first vertex








Thus, vσ(s) < v which contradicts the definition of v, and proves that Z(σ′) ⊆ Z(σ). ◀
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B Proof of the value of a q-SSG
Here, we prove Th. 23.
Let us remark that a q-SSG can be assumed to have all its probability transition of the
form p/q. The idea here is to notice that it is possible to loop with a certain probability on
the same random vertices.
▶ Lemma 27. Let G be a q-SSG, then there is G′ a q-SSG with the same vertices which
defines the same expectation Ex0σ,τ (·|·) and such that for all x ∈ VR and all x′ ∈ N+(x) then
there is an integer px,x′ such that px(x′) = px,x′/q.
Proof. For a a random vertex in G, and qa < q such that for every other vertex x in G there
is px ∈ N and a probability px/qa to go directly from a to x, we change those probabilities
to px/q and we add a probability p/q to stay in a, where:




Now, we state the classical matrix-tree theorem that we use in our proof (see e.g. [7]).
Let G be a directed multigraph with n vertices, then the Laplacian matrix of G is a n× n
matrix L(G) = (li,j)i,j≤n defined by:
(i) li,j equals −m where m is the number of arcs from i to j.
(ii) li,i is the number of arcs going to i, excluding the self-loops.
▶ Theorem 28 (Matrix tree theorem for directed multigraphs). For G = (V, E) a directed
multigraph with vertices V = {v1, . . . , vk} and L its Laplacian matrix, the number of spanning
trees rooted at vi is det(L̂i,i) where L̂i,i is the matrix obtained by deleting the i-th row and
column from L.
We can now prove Th. 23.
Proof of Th. 23. The beginning of the proof is the same as in [14] and [4]. We start by
transforming the game with fixed strategies in a Markov Chain with equivalent values.
Then, we show that the value of each vertex can be written det Bidet q(I −A) using Cramer rule,
for Bi and A two matrix which will be carefully defined. To conclude, we will show that
det q(I −A) < qr by creating a graph obtain from our initial game and using Th. 28.
We consider a q-SSG G and two positional strategies σ and τ . Without loss of generality,
we can restrict ourselves to the computation of non-zero, non-sink values. Thus, each vertex
has a non-zero probability to reach the 1-sink. To compute the values vσ,τ , we can consider
GA an SSG with vertices VR ∪ VS : the random vertices and the sinks of V . The value of the
sinks is not changed and the probability distribution p′x is defined as follows. For x ∈ VR
and x′ in GA, we call Mx,x′ the set of max and min vertex y in N+(x) such that there is a





The graph GA has r + 2 vertices that we denote by a1, . . . , ar+1, ar+2 where ar+1 is the
0-sink and ar+2 is the 1-sink. Let b be the r-dimensional column vector with bi = p′ai(ar+2).
We define A the r × r matrix, with Ai,j = p′ai(aj).
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The values of the random vertices are defined by the vector z that satisfies the following
equation:
z = Az + b
Let I be the identity matrix, (I −A) is invertible because each random vertex has access to
a sink and every eigenvalue of A is strictly less than 1. We refer to [14] for details. Hence,
the equation has a unique solution and z is also solution of:
q(I −A)z = qb





where Bi is the matrix q(I −A) where the i-th column has been replaced by qb. The value
det Bi is an integer. See [4] for more details. Our goal is now to bound det q(I −A).
From the graph GA, we construct the graph G′ by inverting all arcs, and duplicating an
arc of probability p/q into p arcs of probability 1/q. We also add an arc coming from the
1-sink to the 0-sink and one from the 0-sink towards the 1-sink. Figure 3 shows an example
of the transformation from G to G′. The Laplacian L of G′ is thus the following matrix.
L =
 q(I −A)T B
0 1 11 1

Indeed, every random vertex has indegree q minus the number of loops. Thus the number







In other words, the number of spanning trees of G′ is equal to det q(I −A). Furthermore,
each spanning tree contains exactly one incoming arcs for every random vertices, and the
arc (ar+2, ar+1) has to be used. Thus, there is at most qr spanning trees rooted in G′ and
det q(I −A) ≤ qr. ◀
C Bounding the Number of Iterations of GSIA
We introduce the notion of switch and anti-switch, to prove that the improvement is at least
q−r rather than q−2r.
▶ Definition 29. A switch (resp. an anti-switch) of a max strategy σ with switched
set S ⊆ Vmax is a strategy σS defined by σS(x) = σ(x) for x /∈ S, and satisfying
vσ(σ(x)) < vσ(σS(x)) (resp. vσ(σ(x)) > vσ(σS(x))) for x ∈ S (hence σS(x) ̸= σ(x)).
A common tool to solve SSGs is the fact that a switch increases the value of a strategy,
while an anti-switch decreases it. Within our framework of transformed game, it is extremely
simple to prove.
▶ Lemma 30. If σS is a switch of σ, then σS > σ. If σS is an anti-switch of σ, then σS < σ.





























Figure 3 Example of a transformation of a graph G into a graph G′.
Proof. Consider G[A, σ] the game obtained from G, where A is the set of all arcs of G.
Let us consider x a vertex switched in σ′, that is with vGσ (σ(x)) < vGσ (σ′(x)). Then,
because all arcs are in A, we have vG[A,σ]σ (x) = vGσ (σ(x)) and v
G[A,σ]
σ′ (x) = v
G
σ (σ′(x)). Hence,
vG[A,σ]σ (x) < v
G[A,σ]
σ′ (x) and for v
G
σ (σ(x)) ≥ vGσ (σ′(x)), σ(x) = σ′(x), which implies σ′ ≻
G[A,σ]
σ.
Prop. 18 proves σ′ >
G
σ.
The proof is the same for an anti-switch, since σ ≻
G[A,σ]
σ′ ⇒ σ >
G
σ′ (which can be proved
similarly as Prop. 18, while keeping in mind that in the decreasing case, creating absorbing
set lowers the value). ◀
We use the previous lemma to prove Th. 24.
Proof. Let us consider σ the strategy computed at some point by GSIA and σ′ the next
strategy. By Prop. 18, σ < σ′. Hence, by Lemma 30, σ′ cannot be an anti-switch of σ. Thus,
there is a max vertex x such that vσ(σ(x)) < vσ(σ′(x)). We recall that σ′(x) denotes the
successor of x under strategy σ′.
Since σ < σ′, we have vσ(x) = vσ(σ(x)) < vσ(σ′(x)) ≤ vσ′(σ′(x)) = vσ′(x). We now
evaluate vσ(σ′(x))− vσ(σ(x)). In the game G, under the strategies σ, τ(σ), Th. 23 implies
that for some t ≤ qr, vσ(σ(x)) = p/t and vσ(σ′(x)) = p′/t. We have p/t < p′/t, thus
p′/t − p/t ≥ 1/t ≥ 1/qr. Hence, the value of some max vertex increases by 1/qr in each
iteration of GSIA. Since there are n max vertices and their values are bounded by 1, there
are at most nqr iterations. ◀
D Amortised Complexity of GSIA
Here, we prove Th. 25.
Proof. We assume that r < n, otherwise the theorem is trivial. Let σ′ be the strategy
computed by GSIA at some point, improving on the strategy σ. GSIA must compute G[A, σ′],
and thus vσ′ and we explain a method to do so efficiently.
We assume that the order of the values (in G) of the random vertices is the same for σ
and σ′. Then, knowing this order and σ′, it is easy to compute τ(σ′) a best response to σ′
in O(r log(r) + n) time [1]. Then, we can compute the values vσ′,τ(σ′) in time O(C1(r, qr)),
since it is done by solving a linear system of dimension r with precision qr, a task which
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is simpler than solving a linear program. Since C1(r, qr) is at least quadratic in r, then
C1(r, qr) < C1(n, qr)r/n and by hypothesis C2(n, r, q) = O(C1(n, qr)r/n), hence a step is of
complexity at most O(C1(n, qr)r/n). There are at most nqr such steps, for a total complexity
of O(rqrC1(n, qr)).
We need to detect when the assumption that the values of the random vertices are the
same for σ and σ′ is false. If vσ′,τ(σ′) satisfies the optimality conditions at the min vertices,
then τ(σ′) is a best response. Otherwise, we compute the best response by solving a linear
program in time C(n, qr). In that case, the order of the random vertices has changed:
there are two vertices x1 and x2 such that vσ(x1) < vσ(x2) and vσ′(x1) > vσ′(x2). Hence,
vσ′(x1) > vσ(x2), which implies that vσ′(x1)− vσ(x1) > vσ(x2)− vσ(x1) > q−r.
We have proved that when the random order changes, the value of some random vertex
increases by at least q−r, hence there are at most rqr such steps. The complexity from these
steps is bounded by O(rqrC1(n, qr)), which proves the theorem. ◀
